A Matter of Consciousness

Science, Philosophy,

and the East-West Paradigms

 November 2003, Singpore

Although notions of “Western materialism” and “Indian philosophy” are more conglomerate generalizations than they are true descriptions of two distinct schools of thought, we may nevertheless speak meaningfully of certain trends arising with more or less frequency on either side of these encampments.  One of the most prominent distinctions played out across this boundary line is the philosophical treatment of the relationship between matter and consciousness.  The account in traditional western materialism, as found in Marxism, humanism and much post-enlightenment scientific inquiry, is, simply put, that consciousness is caused by matter.  Whether this takes the shape of economic conditions giving rise to false consciousness in Marx, or brain function giving rise to consciousness itself in popular neurobiology, the basic supposition in this line of thought remains the same – that is, that matter precedes consciousness.  A quick cognitive leap to the east, however, and it seems the materialist world has turned upside down.  For in many of the philosophical schools of India, we find that just the opposite supposition has been made.  In these traditions, the ultimate reality, termed Brahman, is itself conscious – and in fact the entire phenomenal world is manifest from this consciousness.  In the school of Advaita Vedanta in particular, the notion of Brahman is identical with the notion of Atman (pure consciousness) – and the realm of appearance, or maya, arises from this ultimate conscious totality.  In either case we see that the basic supposition made is precisely opposite to that of traditional western materialism – that is, that consciousness precedes matter.

From these generalizations one might quickly conclude that in this particular field, Eastern and Western Ontologies have irreconcilable differences.  One would certainly come to think so in reading the works of popular American philosopher John Searle, who, with his theory of “Biological Naturalism[1]” states in no uncertain terms that consciousness itself is nothing more than the result of brain process – and furthermore, that this is now an irrefutable scientific fact.  This sort of fundamentalist attitude is, fortunately, not exhaustive, and in fact many more open-minded philosophers have recently sought to build a bridge between these two opposing East-West Paradigms.  R. Puligandla in particular has given a comprehensive and compelling account of conceptual parallels between the Advaita Vedanta school and modern physics.  I will turn to his paper on this subject in particular, as in the first place it collapses notions of alienation between Indian philosophy and Western science, and in the second place it specifically treats the notion of consciousness in both an Eastern and Western context.  I hope to show with this examination, in conjunction with a comparison to the theories of Searle, that the two opposing viewpoints outlined above need not necessarily be mutually exclusive.

Simply put, Puligandla’s position in Modern Physics and Advaita Vedanta is that there are numerous and provocative parallels between the theoretical groundwork of quantum physics and the ontological groundwork espoused by Advaita Vedanta.  In particular, he draws a comparison between the underlying ontological unity in Brahman, and the non-local causality that is implied by Bell’s Theorem.  The implications of this latter scientific theory, roughly translated, are that it is apparently physically possible to transfer information faster than the speed of light and thus without regard for space or time, and furthermore that such transfers are occurring constantly[2].  This kind of trans-spatial and trans-temporal connectivity implies a “deeper” matrix of connections underlying the apparent (phenomenal) world.  As Puligandla sees it, this kind of “deeper” matrix is precisely what is implied in the concept of Brahman – that is, an ultimate totality from which all phenomena are manifest.  As he puts it, “This observation is fully consistent with the teachings of Advaita Vedanta that all phenomena (appearances), being founded in Brahman, are connected with each other.”  (192). 

Of course, in Advaita Vedanta, Brahman and Atman (pure consciousness) “are identical, that is ‘Atman’ and ‘Brahman’ are different labels for one and the same reality.” (183).  For the purposes of this paper I will henceforth refer to this singular reality as Atman, as it is this term especially that carries the connotation of consciousness.  Now, it is Atman in particular that comes into play as we fall upon the Dilemma inherent in Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle, which Puligandla states as follows:

“It is impossible to determine (measure) precisely and simultaneously the values of a pair of conjugate variables of a microphysical entity, for instance, an electron.  Examples of pairs of conjugate variables are position and momentum and energy and time.”  (190)

            This much debated issue is nevertheless central to the success of quantum theory, and to make a long story short, the basic problem is that it seems to imply, at the sub-atomic level, that reality does not have a determinate structure prior to being observed by the physicist.  If this principle holds true, then consciousness is no longer an impartial observer in the field of science, but rather an integral part of the scientific equation.  Both Subjectivity and Consciousness thus become active participants in determining the structures of the phenomenal world.  This, claims Puligandla, is in perfect accord with the Advaita Vedanta principle of super-imposition – which holds that the world of appearances arises through an imposition of categorical and conceptual frameworks onto the formless ultimate reality.  In this sense, the pure consciousness and absolute reality of Atman becomes dressed up in phenomenal clothing by the psychological self (jiva), and thus the phenomenal world is created.  This is only one interpretation of the Indeterminacy Principle[3], but in many ways it remains the best one.  For the purposes of this paper, I will assume this interpretation to be more or less accurate, if for no other reason then to demonstrate a workable harmony between the Advaita Vedanta notion of the primacy of Consciousness, and an as-yet un-refuted Western science – a science which itself seems to imply that consciousness may have a necessary determining role in the fabric of physical reality.

Turning now to the other camp:  In Mind, Language, and Society - Philosophy in the Real World, Searle builds toward his assertion of “biological naturalism” in a somewhat roundabout manner.  He begins with a critique both of Cartesian Dualism and what he calls “materialism” – although in the case of the latter, he does not mean materialism in the traditional sense of matter existing first and giving rise to consciousness.  Rather, by “materialism” Searle in this instance is isolating certain branches of psychology and their philosophical counterparts (behaviorism, functionalism, etc…), all of which would make the claim that all human behavior reduces completely and absolutely to physical processes alone.  Such schools of thought lack breadth, he claims, because they deny that consciousness exists as a first person, subjective experience – in fact they claim that consciousness is more or less irrelevant to the human condition[4].  Searle’s odd alternative to this is simply a dressed up re-statement of traditional materialism – what he calls “biological naturalism” is the claim that consciousness does indeed exist, but that its existence is explainable solely as the result of  biological brain functions.  As he puts it when first making this claim: “It is always a good idea to remind ourselves of the facts, to remind ourselves of what we actually know.  We know for a fact that all of our conscious states are caused by brain processes.  This proposition is not up for grabs.[5]”  John Searle then gets the best of both worlds – he allows for consciousness to exist as vital to the human condition, while at the same time relegating it to a position whereby it can be completely contained within the field of neurobiology.  He has refuted the most extreme (and most ridiculous) brands of materialism, but still firmly holds onto a fundamentalist materialism of his own – that is, quite specifically, the primacy of matter – that matter precedes consciousness.  And of course, if this is true, the entire tradition of Advaita Vedanta is done away with in a single blow – for as we have seen, they specifically claim just the opposite – that consciousness precedes matter.

While Searle’s claim is rhetorically powerful – we must take note that, in this particular text, it is accompanied by not a shred of scientific evidence nor a single philosophical argument[6].  His claim for “biological naturalism” as he calls it, is presented as axiomatic – that is to say, it is simply a given ontological premise.  This distinction is important, as it might equally be argued that the Advaita Vedanta school has done the same thing with its own axiomatic claims about the nature of matter and consciousness – that is, they take their initial premise of the primacy of consciousness as a paradigmatic given.  In this sense at least it seems that John Searle and Advaita Vedanta have taken much the same approach in dealing with the matter-consciousness equation – though indeed they start from opposite linguistic corners.  Perhaps more ironic is that both lines of thought ultimately take the stance of philosophical Empiricism in order to generate their opposing premises.  For Searle (we assume) “Biological Naturalism” can only be derived through the philosophical assumptions underlying scientific empiricism –i.e. that the observation of experimental results by the scientific practitioner provides a completely accurate map of existing phenomena – in short it seems to be Searle’s assumption that all existing, meaningful phenomena must be explainable through this process of systematic observation.  Thus, because certain observed alterations in brain function correspond with reported alterations in subjective consciousness[7], he assumes that brain function actually causes consciousness.   Furthermore it would seem that this is the only stance that scientific fundamentalism can take, for it is only brain function, and not first-person subjective consciousness, which can be empirically observed by the third-person perspective of the scientist.  And Science, being a closed system, is never permitted to leave its own paradigmatic arena.

            Following this line of thought, the doors swing open rather quickly to admit a much larger criticism of the notion that science is the sole producer of ultimate or absolute truths - as opposed to the partial, relative, and perspectival truths (still imminently useful!) that systematic empirical observation does undoubtedly yield.  But, rather than embark down this daunting path of deconstruction, I merely wish to point out that both Advaita Vedanta and scientific method have taken an unexpectedly similar approach to the production of axioms[8].  As I have said, the notion that Atman is the ultimate reality from which is manifest the phenomenal world of appearance, is an axiomatic claim.  Nevertheless it is grounded in the same philosophical epistemology that underlies the scientific method – that is, Empiricism.  After all, the rhetorical punch behind the notion of Atman is that it cannot be sufficiently described – it can only be experienced.  Thus both the existence and the importance of Atman are founded, and defended, on empirical grounds.  The practice of yoga exists specifically as a route to the experience of Atman – in this way the practitioner of yoga is not unlike the scientist seeking objective truth; both undertake a systematic empirical exploration in search of “deep” reality, and both use their consciousness as the primary tool with which to do it.  Of course, science makes pretense at somehow shedding the subjectivity of the observer, but really this may not be so different from the yogic practitioner’s goal to shed jiva, the individual, psychological self.  Both practices attempt to remove both personality and interference from their results, and in so doing arrive upon the ontological fundamentals of existence.  That science seeks these answers in the phenomenal world of appearance (maya), while yoga seeks answers in the absolute realm of pure consciousness (Atman), is simply indicative of a single binary being explored from opposite directions.  Furthermore, we find that in both cases the concluding axiom is inseparable from the ontological starting point, that is, the primacy of matter, and the primacy of consciousness, respectively.  Thus, from the perspective of the scientists, of course it looks as though Consciousness arises from observable phenomena – while from the perspective of Advaita Vedanta, of course it looks as though observable phenomena arise from Consciousness.  Taken thus in tandem, each opposing claim becomes more an indicator of ontological positioning than an accurate account of a singular ontological totality.  And from this perspective, choosing one over the other seems a bit like declaring that one side of a coin precedes and is thus superior to the other side.  Or, as the ancient tribal war-cry goes, “My God is better than your God!”

            If the reader has detected in this essay a certain preference for Puligandla and the Advaita Vedanta account of matter and consciousness, it is only because, in my opinion, this particular Eastern tradition seems a bit more receptive to the possibility of a larger, more inclusive ontological picture.  As Puligandla puts it, “Advaita Vedanta does not deny the phenomenal world or its reality.”  (183).  From this, and from the adherence to the proposition that Atman is by its very nature resistant to linguistic categories, one gets a sense of both ontological pluralism and ontological tolerance – we seek to know aspects of the big picture without attempting to contain and control the totality.  My objection to Searle’s claim that brain function causes consciousness is that by using the word “causes” he attempts to cram the entire ontological sphere into a singular, closed, and finite function.  Had he replaced “causes” with “corresponds with,” “effects,” “affects,” “communicates with,” “participates in” or even “enables” – he might still make meaningful investigation into the relationship without compressing all of existence into the linguistic containment field of “matter.”  If we look to the opposite claim as made by Advaita Vedanta, Puligandla tells us “Brahman … manifests itself as the world of phenomena” (183).  Simply put, “manifest” implies a more complex and dynamic relationship than “cause,” which is almost certainly an over-simplification[9].  In fact, had Searle claimed that brain function manifests consciousness, he would have had no need to exclude the corollary possibility that consciousness might simultaneously exist independently from matter – an independence, perhaps, that is temporarily collapsed when brain function manifests an aspect of this consciousness at a particular space-time coordinate.  This latter postulation may seem groundless or fanciful, and certainly it is only a theory – but in my opinion this actually seems a much more reasonable explanation than the billiard-ball causality asserted by Searle.  The point being, if we are to be truly honest with ourselves as scientists and philosophers, it is inappropriate to claim ontological monopoly over those fields which we are still exploring – and the relationship between matter and consciousness is certainly just such a field.  To do otherwise limits our inquiry and our discovery – and in fact, will most likely have a preventative effect on our developing apprehension of deeper truths[10].

In any case, this discussion has thus far omitted one key aspect of the Advaita Vedanta perspective – and that is that Atman itself is trans-temporal.  That is to say, in the tradition which holds the primacy of consciousness, that very consciousness finds its ultimate situation outside of the linear time-stream.  This might at first glance seem like fanciful Eastern mysticism – however, we must in all fairness remind ourselves once again of the yet unrefuted Bell’s Theorem, which postulates trans-temporal connectivity as a fundamental facet of our universe.  Taken as such, the “debate” becomes even less well defined.  As I assume Searle and his like-minded colleagues are only interested in phenomena that take place within the linear time stream, we may in fact allow him his account of consciousness as a perfectly valid temporal account.  As far as temporality is concerned, the functioning of the brain may indeed act as the cause of consciousness, insofar as the brain is the direct manifestation of consciousness within the time-stream.  In this sense, it is perfectly valid to say that, in temporal terms, consciousness ceases to exist when the brain ceases to exist.  In the meantime, from the trans-temporal realm in which Atman is founded, the individual consciousness has a different kind of cause altogether.  Temporal death then, is simply the end of the linear consciousness – a movement of sorts into the trans-temporal sphere of Atman – perhaps not altogether unlike a software program uploading into the internet.

Leaving the materialists to their time stream, the question then becomes – can such a trans-temporal consciousness actually exist?  Only time, and possibly Yoga, will tell.

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